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Nontraded REITs are an attractive buy-and-hold investment for income-oriented investors. Sold through 
broker-dealers, shares in these real estate investment trusts do not trade on public exchanges, promise 
relatively high returns, and contain specific triggers for liquidating the trust. In the first such study of 
nontraded REITs, an examination of the comparative effects of a long holding period and a short holding 
period shows that investors who purchase hospitality REITs early in the cycle see a diminished return as a 
result of subsequent sales. In effect, the early investors subsidize the commissions paid to the dealers 
who sell to late-term investors. This effect is an unintended consequence of the fact that the REITs’ share 
prices are fixed, regardless of the value of the underlying assets. The REITs’ high dividend structure 
somewhat mitigates the effect, but those high dividends mean that some REITs’ payout exceeded the 
amount cash they took in (as measured by funds from operations). While these characteristics do not 
mean that investors should exclude nontraded REITs from their portfolios, would-be investors should 
apply due diligence. This report offers recommendations to help guide that process. 
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ExEcutivE Summary
Nontraded REITS:
N
ontraded REITs are an attractive buy-and-hold investment for income-oriented investors. 
Sold through broker-dealers, shares in these real estate investment trusts do not trade on 
public exchanges, promise relatively high returns, and contain specific triggers for 
liquidating the trust. In the first such study of nontraded REITs, an examination of the 
comparative effects of a long holding period and a short holding period shows that investors who 
purchase hospitality REITs early in the cycle see a diminished return as a result of subsequent sales. In 
effect, the early investors subsidize the commissions paid to the dealers who sell to late-term investors. 
This effect is an unintended consequence of the fact that the REITs’ share prices are fixed, regardless of 
the value of the underlying assets. The REITs’ high dividend structure somewhat mitigates the effect, 
but those high dividends mean that some REITs’ payout exceeded the amount cash they took in (as 
measured by funds from operations). While these characteristics do not mean that investors should 
exclude nontraded REITs from their portfolios, would-be investors should apply due diligence. This 
report offers recommendations to help guide that process.
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Nontraded REITS:
Considerations for Hotel Investors
P
rivate equity funding for hotel real estate investment in the U.S. historically comes from small 
hotel companies, individual investors, and pension funds. These sources remain dominant 
today, as evidenced by the recent wave of hotel public-to-private company transactions (see 
Exhibit 1).1 The first opportunity for individual U.S. investors to purchase shares in publicly 
traded portfolios of hotel property occurred in 1960, with enactment of a law establishing real estate 
investment trusts (REITs). The REIT concept has proliferated in recent years as other countries have 
adopted similar laws. 
1 An evaluation of private equity investment in hotel companies can be found in: J.B. Corgel, “Private Equity Investment in Public Hotel Companies: 
Recent Past, Long-Term Future,” Cornell Hospitality Report, Vol. 8, No. 10 (June 2008), Center for Hospitality Research, chr.cornell.edu.
 by John B. Corgel and Scott Gibson
Investment in REITs expanded during the early 1990s, 
when real estate fund sponsors began raising money directly 
from individual investors using broker-dealer channels. 
These sponsors make investments for individuals in hotels 
and other properties of sizes and quality levels that indi-
viduals would have difficulty investing in for themselves. 
Replicating marketing networks established by mutual fund 
groups, sponsors offer real estate investment programs to the 
broad population of investors who use the services of local 
financial planners (mostly individuals). 
A chief attraction of REITs for real estate sponsors is 
the favorable income tax treatment that goes along with 
this ownership form. Thus organized, the sponsors that use 
broker-dealers operate as private companies known as non-
traded REITs. Even though these firms do not sell shares on 
public exchanges they must follow Securities and Exchange 
Cornell Hospitality Report • November 2008 • www.chr.cornell.edu   7
Commission (SEC) rules for disclosure of information about 
their activities and financial performance, because of the 
way in which they raise money from the public. A closely 
related type of REIT, known as private REITs, avoids broker-
dealers by raising money even more privately by soliciting 
family members. These REITs fall outside the disclosure 
rules of the SEC. A more complete description of the differ-
ences between public, nontraded, and private REITs appears 
in Exhibit 2, overleaf.
In this report, we focus on nontraded REITs because of 
the huge volume of equity these companies raised in recent 
years and the important position that three nontraded hotel 
REITs, namely, Apple, CNL, and Inland, maintained in 
the hotel property market during the current decade.2 The 
2 CNL Hotels and Resorts was acquired by Morgan Stanley Real Estate 
and Ashford Hospitality Trust in 2007 for $6.6 billion. Apple and Inland 
continue to operate as nontraded REITs. 
amount of equity controlled by REITs is considerable. In 
2003, for example, all nontraded REITs raised $7 billion 
through broker-dealer channels, while all publicly traded 
REITs raised $8.1 billion through public stock offerings. By 
2007 the amount of money raised by nontraded REIT spon-
sors reached over $11 billion, while publicly traded REITs 
managed to raise more than $13 billion.3 
This report provides general information about how 
nontraded REITs operate. We offer both positive and nega-
tive aspects of nontraded REIT investing from the perspec-
tive of individual investors, special emphasis is placed on 
hotel investment opportunities available through broker-
dealers. In particular, we explain one of the negative aspects, 
which involves reduced returns for those who buy early, as 
3 Robert A. Stanger & Co. tracks nontraded REIT financial flows. Publicly 
traded REIT financial flows come from the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT).
Exhibit 1
Selected public-to-private hospitality transactions, 2004 to present 
 Date public company target private company acquirer price*
2004
Extended Stay America Blackstone $2.0B
Prime Hospitality Blackstone $790M
Boca Resorts Blackstone $1.1B
2005
Wyndham International Blackstone $3.2B
Raffles* Colony Capital $1.0B
La Quinta Corporation Blackstone $3.4B
2006
Fairmont Hotels & Resorts Kingdom and Colony Capital $3.9B
Meristar Hospitality Corporation Blackstone $2.6B
Kerzner International Investor Group $3.8B
Boykin Westmont and Caisse de depot $416M
Jameson JER Partners $371M
Intrawest Corporation Fortress $2.8B
Four Seasons Hotels Kingdom and Cascade and Triple Holdings $3.4B
2007
CNL Hotels & Resorts* Morgan Stanley Real Estate $6.6B
Inkeepers USA Trust Apollo $1.5B
Highland Hospitality Corporation JER Partners $2.0B
Eagle Apollo $237M
Crescent Real Estate Equities Morgan Stanley Real Estate $6.5B
Harrah's Apollo and Texas Pacific $17.1B
Hilton Hotels Blackstone $26B
 *Notes: This table presents reported transactions involving publicly companies mostly in the U.S. that were sold to private equity investors 
during past past three years. Price may not reflect assumption of debt. Raffles is not a U.S. public company. CNL Hotels & Resorts is technically 
not a public company, but as an unlisted REIT, CNL followed all SEC reporting requirements and attempted an IPO in 2005. Sources: Bear 
Stearns, PKF Hospitality Research.
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publicly traded rEitS nontraded rEitS private rEitS
overview Registered with the SEC; shares 
trade on national stock 
exchanges.
Registered with the SEC; shares 
do not trade on national stock 
exchanges.
Not registered with the SEC; 
shares do not trade on national 
stock exchanges.
liquidity Shares are listed and traded on 
major stock exchanges, like any 
other publicly traded stock. Most 
are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).
Shares are not traded on public 
stock exchanges. Redemptions 
are limited and usually subject to 
a minimum holding period. 
Investor exit generally linked to a 
required liquidation deadline or 
the listing of the stock on a 
national stock exchange.
Shares are not traded on public 
stock exchanges. Existence of, 
and terms of, any redemption 
programs varies by company and 
are generally limited in nature.
transactions Brokerage costs the same as for 
buying or selling any other 
publicly traded stock.
Typically, fees of 10 to 15 percent 
of the investment are charged 
for broker-dealer commissions 
and other up-front costs, in 
addition to ongoing 
management fees and expenses. 
Back-end fees may be charged.
Varies by company.
management Typically self advised and self 
managed.
Typically externally advised and 
managed. 
Typically externally advised and 
managed.
minimum investment One share, at market offered 
price.
Typically $1,000 to $2,500. Typically $1,000 to $25,000; 
higher for REITs designed for 
institutional investors.
independent Directors Stock exchange rules require a 
majority of directors to be 
independent of management. 
NYSE and NASDAQ rules call for 
fully independent audit, 
nominating, and compensation 
committees.
Subject to North American 
Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) regulations, 
which require that independent 
directors comprise a majority of 
the board and of each board 
committee.
Not required.
investor control Investors re-elect directors. Investors re-elect directors. Investors re-elect directors.
corporate Governance Specific stock exchange rules on 
corporate governance.
Subject to state and NASAA 
regulations.
Not required.
Disclosure obligation Required to make regular 
financial disclosures to the 
investment community, including 
quarterly and yearly audited 
financial results with 
accompanying filings to the SEC.
Required to make regular SEC 
disclosures, including quarterly 
and yearly financial reports. (The 
requirement comes from the use 
of third-party broker–dealers.)
Not required. Money is raised 
privately and independent of 
third parties.
performance 
measurement
Numerous independent 
performance benchmarks 
available for tracking public REIT 
industry. Wide range of analyst 
reports available to the public.
No independent source of 
performance data available.
No public or independent source 
of performance data available.
Exhibit 2
comparison of rEit characteristics
 Source: Modified from: Allen Kenney, “Choices, Choices, Choices: Investors Have More Ways to Buy and Sell Real Estate than Ever Before,” Real Estate Portfolio, March-April 
2008, pp. 35-40.. 
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compared to those who do not hold for such a long term. 
The information in the report should be a resource for any-
one contemplating investment in hotels through one of these 
programs and for anyone contemplating hotel real estate 
fund sponsorship as a nontraded REIT. Herein, we profile 
Apple, CNL, and Inland REITs.
Institutional Detail
As far as we know, this is the first professional and academic 
report to analyze the nontraded REIT structure. Conse-
quently, we provide in this section some essential details 
about how these businesses operate.4 As shown in Exhibit 
3, the ownership entity is embedded in a complex network 
of relationships with service providers and regulators. The 
chain that connects REITs to investors is our main inter-
4 No mention of nontraded REITs was found in the following reviews 
of the academic REIT literature: J.B. Corgel, W. McIntosh, and S.H. Ott, 
“Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Review of the Financial Economics 
Literature,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), pp. 13- 
43; and E.N. Zietz, G.S. Sirmans, and H.W. Friday, “The Environment 
and Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts”, Journal of Real Estate 
Portfolio Management, Vol. 9 No.2 (2003), pp. 127-165.
Exhibit 3
Structure of nontraded rEit business 
and regulatory relationships, showing 
money flows, organizational 
structure, and regulatory structure
SEC/NASD
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est. This chain begins with the establishment of an in-house 
broker-dealer affiliate that develops contractual relationships 
with national and regional managing dealers, such as A.G. 
Edwards. 5 Local financial planners acting as soliciting dealers 
for national and regional broker-dealers then sell investment 
programs of nontraded REIT sponsors to mostly individual 
investor clients of financial planners. Prior to agreeing to 
sell their investment programs, managing brokers typically 
acquire due diligence reports from third-party companies 
that inform about the capability, competency, and integrity of 
nontraded REIT sponsors. 
Individuals invest as little as $1,000 after being given the 
prospectus prepared by the nontraded REIT. The number of 
dollars actually invested in hotel real estate out of the $1,000 
is net of the fees owed to the network, including the in-house 
broker-dealer. For example, a 10-percent fee, which is not 
atypical, results in $900 invested in the real estate. Again, 
investment programs qualify as securities and therefore must 
conform to requirements set by the SEC.6 Additionally, the 
actions of broker-dealers in their relations with the public 
must conform to North American Securities Administra-
tors Association (NASAA) requirements, and fall under the 
regulatory power of the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD). External advisors—usually subsidiaries of 
nontraded REITs—carry out day-to-day operations includ-
ing relationship management with regulators, attorneys, and 
accountants. 
Nontraded REIT prospectuses contain language about 
how companies will exit the arrangement to provide investors 
with a return of capital. Sometimes the prospectus gives a 
specific date (“on or before”). In other instances the language 
gives nontraded REITs considerable flexibility for this exit. 
As shown in Exhibit 2, any of the following four discrete exit 
events could occur: private market liquidation of proper-
ties, exchange listing, IPO as the combination of exchange 
listing with public capital infusion, or merger or acquisition. 
In all cases, management hopes to capitalize on a favorable 
private-market-to-public-market arbitrage opportunity late 
in the investment period. In 2007, for example, CNL Hotels 
and Resorts did just that. At the height of the private equity 
investment cycle, CNL’s board approved a partial sale to a 
private equity fund sponsored by Morgan Stanley Real Estate, 
with other assets sold to Ashford Hospitality Trust. CNL 
Hotels and Resorts is profiled in the box on page 11.
5 Similar broker-dealer networks are now used in the U.S. to facilitate tax-
free exchanges through tenant-in-common (TIC) funds. For an overview 
of TIC investment, see: Michelle Napoli, “TIC Business Booms,” Real 
Estate Forum, February 2005.
6 A landmark U.S. Supreme Court case in 1946 established that an invest-
ment in real estate in which the profit to investors is determined by the 
activities of a promoter constitutes a security. See: SEC v. Howey Co., 328 
U.S. 293 (1946). 
Investor Appeal and Criticisms
Logic suggests that the sizeable flow of equity capital mov-
ing into nontraded REITs occurred because these invest-
ment programs contained features appealing to individual 
investors. The features cited as being attractive to investors 
include the following.
High dividend—Nontraded REITs promise an annual divi-
dend of between 6.0 percent and 7.75 percent based on 
capital contributed. During recent years, this dividend 
payout ratio far exceeded the dividends offered by 
other investment programs available through financial 
planners. As we show in later in this report, the hefty 
dividend promise resulted in nontraded REIT payout 
ratios exceeding 100 percent of funds from operations 
(FFO), while listed REIT payout ratios equaled ap-
proximate 70 percent of FFO during the same periods.7 
Collateral—Individual investors receive no guarantees 
that dividend payments will continue throughout the 
planned investment period. However, they recognize 
that their money is placed in assets with an active 
secondary trading market should liquidation become 
necessary.8 Also, the continued growth of sponsor-
ing companies sends investors a signal of increasing 
financial strength. 
Return of capital—Despite restrictive share-redemption 
policies, having a planned exit written into the pro-
spectus provides assurances to investors that sponsors 
will return capital upon exiting the investment. 
Fixed share prices—Nontraded REITs offer a vehicle for 
individual investors who want to invest in institutional 
grade hotel real estate without the volatility of publicly 
traded REITs. 
Critics contend that the the benefits of nontraded 
REITs come at considerable cost. The critics typically cite 
the following expenses as disadvantages of investing in non-
traded REITs.
Selling, service, and acquisition fees—The selling, service, 
and acquisition fees paid to nontraded REIT sponsors 
and dealers are typically in the range of 10 percent to 
7 Funds from operations (FFO) is the way in which the REIT industry 
typically records earnings or net income. This calculation is made with-
out a deduction for depreciation. The REIT industry claims that such 
deductions would reduce earnings by too much relative to companies 
without as many highly valued depreciable assets, thus making REITs 
comparatively less attractive investments from an earnings perspective.
8 Nontraded REIT prospectuses shown to investors often contain pic-
tures and financial performance statistics for large, high quality proper-
ties previously purchased by the nontraded REIT. Direct investments in 
quality properties for a little as $1,000 would be well beyond the means 
of most individuals in the absence nontraded REIT and TIC programs. 
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Nontraded Hotel REIT Profiles
 
CNL Hotels and Resorts
CNL Hotels and Resorts, Inc. (formerly known as CNL Hospitality 
Properties, Inc.), was a nontraded REIT located in Orlando, Florida, 
and part of CNL Financial Group, Inc. This company was founded in 
1996 to lease properties across the United States to operators of 
limited-service, extended-stay, and full-service hotel chains and to 
operators of restaurant chains. As the second largest hotel REIT in 
2006, CNL maintained 59 luxury, upper upscale, upscale, and mid-
scale hotel properties in the U.S. (excluding 32 hotels held for sale) 
and one property in Montreal, Canada. In April 2004, CNL Hotels and 
Resorts registered with the SEC for an underwritten offering of 
common and preferred stock shares. Management abandoned this 
attempt at an initial public offering several months later citing poor 
market conditions. 
In January 2007, CNL Hotels and Resorts announced it would be 
acquired by Morgan Stanley Real Estate (a private equity fund). 
Coincidental to this transaction, CNL closed the sale of the held-for-
sale hotels to W2005 New Century Hotel Portfolio, LP (an affiliate of 
Whitehall Street Global Real Estate Limited). The Morgan Stanley Real 
Estate deal, valued at $6.6 billion, was completed in April 2007 for 
outstanding common stock and assumption of outstanding debt at 
$20.50 per share in cash. With this transaction, Morgan Stanley Real 
Estate assumed a portfolio of eight luxury properties located 
throughout the U.S., including the Arizona Biltmore Resort & Spa, 
Ritz-Carlton Orlando, and Grand Wailea Resort Hotel & Spa. 
Concurrently, CNL sold the remaining 51 properties to Ashford 
Hospitality Trust, Inc., for approximately $2.4 billion. These properties 
included 24 full-service and upper-upscale hotels, and 27 premium 
select-service hotels. 
At the end of FY 2006, CNL Hotels and Resorts, Inc., reported funds 
from operations of $132,188,000, an increase of 46.13% over  
FY 2005. It also had a FFO payout ratio of 117.65%.
Throughout the life of this nontraded REIT the company continued to 
pay shareholders a high dividend (managing a high FFO payout ratio) 
and exited at the peak of the property value cycle. The $20.50 per 
share paid by Morgan Stanley was approximately twice the original 
price paid by individual investors. 
 
Inland American Real Estate Trust
Inland American Real Estate Trust, Inc., of Oak Brook, Illinois, is a 
nontraded REIT that is part of Inland Real Estate Group of Companies, 
Inc., which also include a publicly traded REIT (IRC). Inland American 
was founded in 2004 to acquire and develop all types of commercial 
real estate. Inland completed a public offering of stock in August 
2005 by listing 500,000,000 shares of common stock at $10.00 per 
share, and 40,000,000 additional shares at $9.50 per share under its 
distribution reinvestment plan. Its second public offering commenced 
under the same terms on August 1, 2007. These listings essentially 
created a public REIT and the nontraded REIT that exists today. The 
shares of the public REIT have traded in the range of $15 to $17 since 
the initial listing, indicating a positive investment for initial 
shareholders. At the end of FY 2007, the Inland nontraded REIT 
portfolio consisted of eight multifamily, 61 industrial, 26 office, 546 
retail, and 76 hotel properties. The lodging properties include hotels 
franchised by Marriott, Hilton, IHG, and Choice, totaling 10,411 
rooms. 
Inland’s nontraded REIT real estate investment grew 206% from  
FY 2006 to 2007. Funds from operations grew 387%, from 
$48,088,000 to $234,215,000 from FY 2006 to 2007. The ratio of 
loans to assets rose from 1.75 in FY 2006 to 3.42 in 2007. For FY 
2007, Inland American’s dividend payout ratio was 435%. 
Since the end of FY 2007 Inland made three large hotel acquisitions. 
First, Inland nontraded REIT completed the acquisition of RLJ Urban 
Lodging Master LLC, an affiliate entity of RLJ Development, LLC. In 
this deal, Inland paid $466.42 million in cash and assumed $429.14 
million in debt and secured ownership of 22 full- and select-service 
upscale hotels, totaling 4,061 rooms. The properties, Hilton, Hyatt, 
and Marriott franchises, are located mostly in major urban areas, 
including Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.
Second, Inland acquired Richmond-based Apple Hospitality Five for 
$14.05 per share, totaling $678.3 million. Apple Hospitality was 
composed of 28 extended-stay hotel properties (Hilton and Marriott 
franchises) with 3,717 rooms. Third, Inland took Raleigh-based 
Winston Hotels private by paying $15.00 per share and assuming 
$243.64 million in debt. Winston comprised 53 limited-service hotel 
properties (also Hilton and Marriott franchises) with 7,205 rooms. 
15 percent of initial investments, a fee structure some 
critics view as excessive. Fitch, for example, shows that 
the average fee from a $10,000 investment in a nontrad-
ed REIT equals $1,358, while a dollar-equivalent trade 
in a comparable publicly traded REIT costs $29.95.9 
9 S. Fitch, “Blind Faith,” Forbes, September 1, 2003 (www.Forbes.com).
Industry representatives counter with the argument that 
the costs of raising capital through broker-dealer net-
works exceed the costs of bringing in money through 
traditional channels.10 
10 For example, see: B. Johnson, “Let’s Set the Record Straight on Non-
traded REITs’ Success,” National Real Estate Investor, September 1, 2003 
(letter to the editor).
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Redemption policies and exit strategies—Nontraded REIT 
sponsors have come under criticism for restrictive 
redemption policies and vague prospectus language 
regarding exit strategies. The issue of exit strategies has 
been mitigated by such events as the timely sale of CNL 
Hotels and Resorts and the successful public listing of 
a portion of Inland Real Estate Company’s commercial 
real estate portfolio. (A profile of IRC appears on the 
previous page.) This company made several important 
hotel property and company acquisitions during the 
past four years which it now holds in a nontraded REIT. 
Fixed share prices—As we hinted above, fixed share prices 
are marketed as beneficial to investors as a way to avoid 
the volatility of publicly traded REITs. As we explain 
next, however, this policy of maintaining fixed share 
prices in companies that continually offer shares at the 
same or similar fixed prices throughout the investment 
cycle will have adverse consequences to investors who 
buy into programs early in the cycle.
Unintended Consequences of Fixed Share Prices
The emergence of nontraded REITs as highly visible partici-
pants in the commercial real estate markets may be the re-
sult of relatively small investors rationally responding to the 
attractive investment opportunities offered by these firms. 
We just mentioned the criticism from the financial press and 
executives of publicly traded REITs that nontraded REITs 
maintain high fees.11 Less commonly heard is criticism that 
focuses on financial outcomes of the ongoing contractual 
relationship between individual investors and sponsors. We 
believe that those financial issues are more insidious than 
fees, as we explain next.
Nontraded REITs sell shares at a price of approximately 
$10 that either remains fixed or may be modestly adjusted 
11 See, for example: R.A. Smith, “Private Commercial REITs Get into 
the Game,” Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2003, p. B12; R.A. Smith, 
“Questions and Answers about Private REITs,” Wall Street Journal, March 
19, 2003, p. B8; Fitch, op.cit.; C. Ostrowski, “The REIT Wars,” Real Estate 
Forum, May 2004, pp. 60-66; and C. Farrell, “Private REITs Dividend 
Draw,” Business Week, February 13, 2006.
throughout investors’ holding periods. This feature differen-
tiates nontraded REITs from publicly traded REITs, which 
can guarantee neither share price nor dividend payout. 
Inexperienced investors in particular may feel more secure 
with an investment that pays relatively high dividends and 
maintains a constant share price. As Fitch notes, the appar-
ent advantage of a fixed price structure may instead repre-
sent a disadvantage to investors because they cannot share 
in the investment’s appreciation unless the asset is liquidated 
or the company is sold.12 Sharing among investors in future 
appreciation of property values in proportion to their initial 
investment lies at the core of this issue.
We argue that the fixed price feature of nontraded REITs 
potentially diminishes returns for investors who contribute 
capital early in the funding cycle, even considering divi-
dend payout. Our financial economics model shows that 
a continuous investment opportunity at fixed share prices 
effectively transfers wealth to sponsors and soliciting dealers 
in the form of fees paid on the sale of shares to later-term in-
vestors. This contractual feature represents a flaw in the non-
traded REIT structure. Although this wealth-transfer effect 
is moderated by the relatively high dividends, those payouts 
exacerbate the financial stress when nontraded REITs make 
payouts in excess of current cash flow. By contrast, should 
nontraded REITs elect to periodically mark share prices to 
market using either real estate appraisals (following com-
mingled funds) or some other method, the nontraded REIT’s 
business would continue without economically disadvantag-
ing long-term investors.
Summary of Model Results 
For those interested in the development of the financial 
economic model that forms the basis of our analysis, we 
refer to our article in Journal of Property Investment and 
Finance, which tracks returns for nontraded REIT investors 
through the ownership cycle assuming a fixed share price.13 
12 Fitch, op.cit.
13 See: J.B. Corgel. and S. Gibson, “Real Estate Private Equity: The Case 
of U.S. Nontraded REITs,” Journal of Property Investment and Finance, Vol. 
26, No. 2 (2008), pp. 132-150.
The structure of nontraded 
REITs leads to perverse policies 
that produce dividends 
in excess of funds from 
operations.
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Specifically, we examined how long-term investors—those 
who invested early in the life of the nontraded REIT—do 
in a market with property prices appreciating and one with 
property prices declining. In this report we give the results 
of our analysis.
We found that the long-term investors do not benefit 
in either type of market. Because the share price does not 
adjust with the changing fortunes of the property portfolio, 
returns to long-run investors are capped and fees earned 
by sponsors and brokers as subsequent investors sign up to 
enter the REIT come out of the returns that would otherwise 
have been earned by the long-term investors. Furthermore, 
even though long-term investors will not fully participate in 
the “upside” when property prices rise, they fully participate 
in the “downside” when property prices fall. Full downside 
participation occurs when the nontraded REIT sponsor 
must exit according to the investment agreement, property 
prices have fallen during the investment period, and the 
proceeds from the company listing or property sales are not 
sufficient to pay investors the entire fixed price for every 
share they own.
The comparatively large dividends paid to long-term 
investors over extended periods by nontraded REITs help 
mitigate the loss of upside opportunity from appreciation. 
However, we show that these dividend payouts are so high 
relative to dividends paid by publicly traded REITs that they 
cannot be sustained without placing nontraded REITs in 
financial distress.
Perverse Dividend Policy
How dividend policy influences the value of firms and 
cost of equity capital remains one of the more intriguing 
areas of financial economics. Because REITs operate under 
regulatory constraints regarding dividend payout, REIT 
data frequently are used in controlled experiments to test 
hypotheses related to corporate dividend policy.14 Two stud-
14 The REIT Modernization Act of 1999 changed the dividend payout re-
quirement to 90 percent of taxable income from the previous requirement 
of 95 percent. Some publicly traded REITs payout more than 100 percent 
of taxable income, but typically do not payout more than 70 percent of 
FFO.
ies specifically address differential dividend payout ratios 
among REITs. The first paper presents evidence that REIT 
payout ratios are highest when expected cash flow volatility 
is lowest, and, by the same token, payouts are lowest when 
cash flow volatility is highest.15 Strong market fundamentals 
in recent years suggest low expected cash flow volatility and 
high dividend payout, but that concept does not explain why 
differences may occur between nontraded REITs’ payouts 
and those of publicly traded REITs. The second study found 
that corporate performance explains dividend payout and 
yield.16 That study showed that ineffective management with 
respect to producing share price growth instigates higher 
dividend payout to appease disgruntled investors. 
We conclude that too little time has passed in the life 
of nontraded REITs for investors to effectively evaluate the 
effects of either cash flow volatility or the ability of manage-
ment to increase portfolio values. Instead, we are left with an 
explanation that the dividend policies of nontraded REITs 
derive from motives related to rapid asset growth, system fee 
generation, and the need for a defense mechanism against 
wealth transfer created by the fixed-share price structure. 
Empirical Evidence of  
Dividend Policy Distortion
Let’s examine why nontraded REITs’ structure leads to 
perverse dividend policies. These policies produce dividends 
well above those of comparable listed REITs, often in excess 
of 100 percent of FFO. All data come from SNL Securities 
and cover the three-year period 2003 through 2005.17 We 
start with 2003 because prior to that time the nontraded 
REIT data were not considered adequate to form broad 
enough cross-sections by firm size and property type. The 
15 M. Bradley, D.R. Capozza, and P.J. Seguin, “Dividend Policy and Cash-
Flow Uncertainty,” Real Estate Economics, Vol. 26 No. 4 (1998),  
pp. 555-580.
16 C. Ghosh, and C.F. Sirmans, “Do Managerial Motives Impact Dividend 
Decisions in REITs?,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 
32, No. 2 (2006), pp. 327-355.
17 As mentioned earlier, nontraded REITs follow SEC reporting require-
ments despite not having publicly traded stock. Hence SNL is able to 
assemble data on these firms to track their performance.
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table in Exhibit 4 presents the sample of eleven nontraded 
REITs. All of these companies were started after 1995 and 
represent every major property type. Total asset size ranges 
from well under $1 billion to $8 billion. This list includes 
three hotel REITs: those being CNL Hotels and Resorts and 
two Apple Hospitality companies. (Details about the various 
companies launched by Apple appear in the box on page 15.) 
The comparative analysis of nontraded REIT and listed 
REIT dividends during the sample period begins with the 
formation of four shadow portfolios. The first portfolio 
(sector portfolio) consists of forty-one listed REITs span-
ning every property type represented in the nontraded REIT 
sample. The firms were selected to achieve a balance by asset 
size. To eliminate age bias, we formed a second shadow port-
folio (IPO portfolio) that includes twenty-three firms with 
IPOs after 1996. This portfolio also is balanced by property 
type and asset size. Finally, we assembled two similarly bal-
anced portfolios of differing sizes (small size and large size). 
The small size portfolio has seventeen REITs with net asset 
values (NAVs) falling in the range of $400 million to $700 
million and the large size portfolio consists of thirty firms 
with NAVs ranging from $1.2 billion to $3 billion.
Exhibit 5 provides comparisons of average dividend 
payout as a percent of FFO for the nontraded and listed 
REIT portfolios during 2003, 2004, and 2005. The dividend 
payout ratios for listed REITs fall within a normal range 
for REITs of between 60 percent and 75 percent.18 Average 
payout ratios for the sample of nontraded REITs not only 
exceeded those of listed REITs by a sizeable margin, but 
were greater than 100 percent during all three years. This 
means that nontraded REITs paid out more in dividends 
than they received in cash flow over the three-year period in 
question. Logic dictates that such a perverse dividend policy 
is unsustainable.19
18  Farrell, op.cit.
19 An extension of the same analysis for 2006 and 2007 produced nearly 
identical results. 
Exhibit 5
Dividend payouts of nontraded rEits and shadow portfolios of listed rEits, 2003–2005
      rEit categories: nontraded rEits Sector ipo Date Small Size large Size
number of rEits 11 41 23 17 30
2005 106.04% 73.12% 71.32% 66.06% 76.02%
2004 125.45% 73.74% 70.71% 61.51% 75.03%
Exhibit 4
Sample nontraded rEits
. 
 2005 
 company year Established Sector total assets ($000)  regular Dividend
Apple Hospitality Five, Inc. 2001 Hotel $413,447 $0.88
Apple Hospitality Two, Inc. 2001 Hotel $638,176 $0.80
Berkshire Income Realty, Inc. 2002 Multifamily $425,662 $0.00
CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. 1996 Hotel $5,688,782 $1.10
CNL Retirement Properties, Inc. NA Health Care $3,838,761 $0.71
Dividend Capital Trust Inc. 2002 Industrial $2,057,695 NA
G REIT, Inc. 2001 Office $887,499 $0.75
Inland Retail Real Estate Trust, Inc. NA Retail $4,268,088 NA
Inland Western Retail Real Estate Trust, Inc. NA Retail $8,085,933 $0.64
T REIT, Inc. 1998 Office $48,322 NA
Wells Real Estate Investment Trust, Inc. 1998 Office $4,398,565 $0.61
 Note: REITs and selected characteristics as reported by SNL Securities.
 Note: Percentages shown are based on funds from operations. Source is SNL Securities.
P u b l i c l y  t r a d E d  r E i t s 
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Conclusion 
Returning to the creation of REITs in 1960, the idea to pro-
vide federal tax-exempt status to business trusts that invest 
in commercial real estate became law due to the efforts of a 
diverse group of industry and government interests. Beyond 
the motivations of these groups to increase capital flows for 
real estate investment and rehabilitation was the intent of 
making available to individual investors certain advantages 
previously reserved for investors with greater resources. 
These advantages include diversification through pooling 
of funds, access to the benefits of professional investment 
advisors, and the ability to collectively finance properties of 
a scale that most individual investors could not undertake 
by themselves. As the REIT market matured, firms became 
larger and more public. Average investors seeking these 
opportunities found themselves in the public securities envi-
ronment, which many found neither familiar nor completely 
trustworthy. 
Recognizing that a segment of the investor population 
was not comfortable with prevailing commercial real estate 
investment options, sponsors of nontraded REITs reached 
individual investors through existing broker-dealer channels. 
The programs of nontraded REIT sponsors, therefore, direct-
ly align with the spirit of the original U.S. REIT legislation. 
In addition, these programs demonstrated substantial appeal 
as evidenced by the amount of capital flowing to nontraded 
REIT sponsors. We’ve noted that several nontraded REITs 
focused at least partially on making investments in hotel 
property. A subset of these companies currently provides op-
portunities for individual investors to own shared interests 
in and receive attractive dividends from nationally branded 
and independent hotels. 
We have identified one structural flaw present in 
nontraded REIT investment programs—that being the fixed 
share price. The model solutions using a fixed-share-price 
assumption provide several insights. First, opportunistic, 
short-term investors participate only during appreciating 
real estate markets as the underlying value of shares rises 
above fixed share prices. Second, during periods of rising 
property values, opportunistic investors will buy shares 
as long as intrinsic share value exceeds fixed share price, 
driving long-term investors’ profit to the level of dividends. 
As our model indicated, profits in excess of dividends are 
absorbed by participants in the broker-dealer network. 
Third, a high contractual dividend level does mitigate the 
wealth transfer away from long-term investors. As we said, 
a comparative analysis of the dividend payout behavior of 
listed and nontraded REITs during recent years reveals that 
nontraded REITs have paid dividends relative to FFO well in 
excess of listed REITs and also approximately 110 percent of 
their own FFOs. This perverse dividend policy follows from 
the fixed-share price structure adopted by these firms.
Nontraded Hotel REIT Profile
Apple REIT Companies 
Apple REIT Companies, located in Richmond, Virginia, has launched 
several nontraded REITs during the past ten years. The series began 
with the initial capitalization of Apple Suites, Inc., in March 1999. 
Over a two-year period, with capital raised through the issuance of 
nontraded common stock, management acquired 17 Homewood 
Suites consisting of 1,922 suites in 12 states. Apple Hospitality Two 
was initially capitalized in January 2001. Two years later, Apple 
Hospitality Two merged with Apple Suites. The merged entity was 
sold to ING Clarion Partners in 2007 for approximately $877 million. 
Apple Hospitality Five was incorporated and capitalized in 
September 2002. Management began purchasing hotel properties 
totaling 28 Marriott and Hilton hotels, with 3,717 rooms. In 
October 2007, the company was acquired by Inland American Real 
Estate Trust for $14.05 per share. Four Apple REITs currently 
operate. Apple REIT Six has been the most active, having acquired 
68 hotel properties during the past few years. 
Nontraded REIT Apple REIT Six was formed to invest in hotels and 
other selected U.S. real estate. Initial capitalization and the first 
hotel acquisition occurred in 2004. At the end of FY 2007, the 
company owned 67 hotels acquired for $845 million. As an 
example, the company purchased a Hilton Garden Inn hotel in 
Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, for $15.4 million in 2008.
Apple REIT Seven, Inc., is another nontraded REIT formed to invest 
in hotels and other selected real estate. The company began 
operating in May 2005 and acquired its first property in April 2006. 
By year-end 2007, the company owned 44 hotel properties in 17 
states, with a gross purchase price of $773 million. In 2008, the 
company completed purchase of three hotel properties, with a 
gross purchase price of $79 million, in addition to entering into 
contracts for the purchase of four additional hotels. 
Apple REIT Eight, Inc., is an nontraded REIT formed to invest in 
hotels, residential apartment communities, and other real estate in 
selected U.S. metropolitan areas. This company’s first property 
acquisition occurred during November 2007. In FY 2007, Apple 
REIT Eight acquired six hotel properties totaling $85 million. During 
2008, the REIT purchased 23 hotels for $311 million. During this 
period, Apple REIT Eight also entered into contracts for 24 
additional hotels. 
Nontraded REIT Apple Nine was formed in 2007 to invest in hotels, 
residential apartment communities, and other income-producing 
U.S. real estate. At the end of 2008, the entity held $504,000 in 
total assets and $493,000 in total liabilities. As of 2008, Apple REIT 
Nine held no properties and maintained no source of revenue.  
(From Apple REIT’s website, www.applereitcompanies.com/aboutus.
htm.)
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We want to emphasize that the basic structure of 
nontraded REITs has many desirable features that should 
be preserved, but we suggest modification of the fixed share 
price feature to limit investor conflicts. One possibility is 
the commingled fund, which forms a convenient parallel to 
nontraded REIT unit investment in commercial real estate.20 
Ennis describes the institutional arrangement as follows:
In a straightforward process each asset in 
the commingled fund is appraised period-
ically. The value of the properties is then 
added together to arrive at the value for 
the fund. As properties change in value, 
the fund value is adjusted. Commingled 
fund values are quoted as if the properties 
were sold at appraised value (at least on 
average across the properties in the fund). 
… Intrinsic value is determined only by the 
asset appraisal methodology controlled by 
the fund manager.21
Analysts who follow publicly traded REITs use simple, 
low cost (relative to appraisals) NAV calculations to mark 
the values of REIT assets to market. Regardless of the ap-
proach taken, the nontraded REIT business model needs 
adjustment to avoid the undesirable consequences arising 
from fixed offer pricing.
20 See: J. Fosheim, “Private REITs: Commingled Funds with a New Name,” 
Special Report, Green Street Advisors, August 1995.
21 J.L. Ennis “Real Estate Commingled Fund Valuation: Disconnected 
from the Public Markets,” Real Estate Finance, Vol. 12, Winter 1996, p. 36.
Recommendations for Individual Hotel Investors 
Buying Shares in Nontraded REITs 
We see no reason that individuals should avoid investing 
in nontraded REITs that own and operate hotels. These 
REITs offer appealing opportunities for individuals to 
become owners of shares in high quality real estate. Hotels 
performed well in recent years, allowing sponsors to pay 
investors large dividends and then exit and return capital 
with relative ease. We do not anticipate that the near-term 
future income productivity of hotels will equal that of the 
recent past, but hotels should continue to provide relatively 
attractive income streams. That said, the negative features of 
nontraded REIT investment, as outlined in this report, will 
likely persist. Consequently, we offer the following general 
and hotel-specific recommendations to guide individual 
investors.
General recommendations for investing in 
nontraded rEits
Study the track record of the company and management• . 
Previous success certainly does not ensure future suc-
cess, but experienced investment managers likely will 
not make major errors. Past performance regarding 
payment of dividends and exiting investments to return 
capital remain the most important considerations. In-
vestors also should inquire from brokers about disputes 
between sponsors and investors, and search for any 
regulatory actions against nontraded REIT sponsors. 
Read prospectuses• . The focus here should be on sections 
that discuss fees, dividend payment, return of capital, 
and risks. 
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Examine the fee structure• . Before investing money, in-
vestors should have a clear understanding of how much 
of their money will be invested in real estate and how 
much will be extracted for fees.
Review dividend payment policies• . Before investing 
money, investors should have clear understanding of 
conditions under which the sponsor can discontinue 
dividend payments.
Clarify exit strategies• . Before investing money, investors 
should have clear understanding of the language that 
describes the options available to the sponsor for selling 
real estate at the scheduled end point of the investment 
period.
Study tax regulations• . As with any investment, individu-
als should clearly understand the tax implications of 
nontraded REIT investments. For most investors, tax 
treatments are the same regardless of whether the REIT 
lists or does not list shares.
Evaluate holding periods• . The fixed share price allows 
investors to rest easy about day-to-day changes in share 
prices. However, as described in this report, investing 
early in the scheduled investment period exposes these 
investors to wealth transfer when real estate prices are 
increasing. Investors may consider the length of time 
the investment is open and if possible delay commit-
ments until late in this period.
Specific recommendations for investment in hotel 
rEits
Examine the sponsor’s history• . The track record of the 
sponsor as a buyer and seller of hotels is critical to the 
individual investor’s commitment decision to an non-
traded REIT. Hotels are a special case of commercial 
real estate. Experience with office, retail, residential, and 
industrial real estate does not easily translate to hotel 
investment.
Evaluate performance• . If the nontraded REIT already 
owns some hotels, data presentations regarding occu-
pancy and ADR will be informative about the ability of 
the sponsor to buy hotels and select managers. Investors 
should focus on financial performance trends, whether 
the statistics indicate if the hotels operate above the 
average for that market and competitive set, if the hotels 
are located in top markets, and if the hotels have affilia-
tions with established national brands.
Critically assess promises and representations• . If this non-
traded REIT has not yet acquired hotels, look carefully 
at what the sponsor promises.
Pay attention to management• . Investors should be con-
cerned about who will manage the property (including 
reservations, expense management) and who will man-
age assets (including renovations tracking real estate 
market trends).  n
Nontraded REITs offer 
appealing opportunities for 
individuals to become owners 
of shares in high quality 
hotel real estate.
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in these intensive hospitality management seminars led by
Cornell faculty and industry experts. 
Intensive three-day courses are held on the Cornell University
campus in Ithaca, New York in June-July; in Brussels, Belgium
in June and at the Cornell Nanyang Institute in Singapore in
January and July-August.
The Contract Programs
Programs delivered by Cornell faculty for your company. Many
hotel and foodservice management topics available, both “off
the shelf” and custom developed to your needs and delivered
to your management team on the Cornell campus or anywhere
in the world.
Complete program information and applications online:
www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/execed/chr
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Cornell Short Courses and Certifications for Hotel Industry Professionals:
The General Managers Program
Tackle strategic hotel management issues and find 
relevant, specific solutions. Work with a global network
of managers and top Cornell faculty in an intensive
learning experience.
Ten-day programs are held on the Cornell University
campus in Ithaca, New York in January and June and at
the Cornell Nanyang Institute in Singapore in July-August.
The Online Path
Available year-round, choose individual courses or 
combine courses to earn one of six Cornell Certificates.
Interact with an expert instructor and a cohort of your
peers to develop knowledge, and to effectively apply
that knowledge in your organization.
The Professional Development Program
Study and share experiences with peers from around the world
in these intensive hospitality management seminars led by
Cornell faculty and industry experts. 
Intensive three-day courses are held on the Cornell University
campus in Ithaca, New York in June-July; in Brussels, Belgium
in June and at the Cornell Nanyang Institute in Singapore in
January and July-August.
The Contract Programs
Programs delivered by Cornell faculty for your company. Many
hotel and foodservice management topics available, both “off
the shelf” and custom developed to your needs and delivered
to your management team on the Cornell campus or anywhere
in the world.
Complete program information and applications online:
www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/execed/chr
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